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INTRODUCTION
First Security Bank of Utah, N.A. (-First Security"), the
plaintiff and appellant in this action, hereby submits this Reply
Brief pursuant to Rule 24(c) of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure.

The defendants and appellees are represented by two

different attorneys, each of whom have filed a separate brief with
the court.

This Reply Brief responds to the issues raised in both

of those briefs.

For ease of identification, Orville and Ruby

Creech shall be referred to hereinafter as the "Creeches", and
Larry, Joann and Herb Creech shall be referred to as the "Creech
children."
ARGUMENT
I.

THE CREECHES' FILING OF BANKRUPTCY CONSTITUTES AN
ACT OF DEFAULT UNDER THE TERMS OF THE 1986 LOAN
DOCUMENTS.

The 1986 Loan Documents between the Creeches and First
Security provide that the Creeches shall be in default if they
fail to make payments when due or if they become insolvent.
Appellant's Statement of Facts, If 1(a).

See

First Security has

alleged that the Creeches* filing of bankruptcy is an act of
default under the terms of the Loan Documents.
Appellants, pp. 12-16.

See Brief of

The Creeches argue that their bankruptcy

filing does not constitute an act of default because "ipso facto
clauses are not enforceable."
p. 11.

Brief of Orville and Ruby Creech,

However, once an asset is no longer part of the bankruptcyestate, ipso facto clauses become valid and enforceable.

In In re

Bell, 700 F.2d 1053 (6th Cir. 1983), the court explained that
since the asset in question had been abandoned by the trustee, the
creditor was entitled to declare the borrower's loan in default
under the terms of an ipso facto clause contained in the Loan
Documents.
The security Documents authorized [the
creditor] to immediately repossess the Van upon
the filing of a bankruptcy petition (bankruptcy
clause). While this bankruptcy clause was
initially inoperative under 11 U.S.C. § 544
irrespective of such clause, the § 541(c)
prohibition against such a bankruptcy clause
has been held inoperable once the asset has
been abandoned from the estate. Accordingly,
the bankruptcy clause became effective upon
abandonment, the debtors were in default of the
security agreement and therefore no longer
entitled to the primary possessor interest in
the Van.
Id. at 1058 (citations omitted).

In In re Mitchell, 85 B.R. 564

(Bankr. D. Nev. 1988), the court reached a similar result.
"[W]hen the asset is no longer part of the bankruptcy estate, the
[ipso factol clause becomes operative and enforceable."
566.

Id. at

See also In re Whitaker, 85 B.R. 788, 793 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn.

1988), In re Sparaao, 31 B.R. 552, 554 (Bankr. E.D. N.Y. 1983), In
re Schweitzer, 19 B.R. 860, 866-67 (Bankr. E.D. N.Y. 1982), and In
re Whatlev, 16 B.R. 394, 397 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1982).
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has not specifically ruled
on this issue.

In Lowry Federal Credit Union v. West. 882 F.2d
-2-

1543 (10th Cir. 1989), the court stated H[w]e do not rule on the
enforceability of such ripso factol clauses because the issue has
not been raised and thus is not before us[.]M

Id. at 1546, fn. 5.

While it is true that cases have been decided suggesting ipso
facto clauses are unenforceable as a matter of law, e.g. Riqgs
National Bank of Washington, D.C. v. Perry, 729 F.2d 982, 984-85
(4th Cir. 1984), and other cases cited by the Creeches, those
cases are distinguishable from the instant case because they
involve cases where either the bankruptcy proceedings were ongoing
or the debtors had received their discharge.

In the instant case,

the Creeches did not receive a discharge, failed to comply with
the terms of their confirmed Plan, had their bankruptcy case
dismissed as a result of their failure to comply with the
confirmed Plan, and in the First District Court, repudiated the
very bankruptcy proceedings upon which they now rely in their
brief.
Even if the cases relied upon by the Creeches were not
distinguishable, however, the treatment of ipso facto clauses in
those cases should not be the law in the State of Utah.

The cases

cited in First Security's brief together with the legislative
history accompanying the text of 11 U.S.C. § 365 make it
abundantly clear that ipso facto clauses in contracts were not
intended to be invalid and unenforceable as a matter of law.
legislative history accompanying the text of § 365 states as
follows:
-3-

The

This subsection does not limit the
application of an ipso facto or bankruptcy
clause if a new insolvency or receivership
occurs after the bankruptcy case is closed.
That is, the clause is not invalidated in toto,
but merely made inapplicable during the case
for the purposes of disposition of the
executory contract or unexpired lease.
Official Historical and Revision Notes, Senate Report No. 95-989,
p. 112 (West 1991).
In the instant case, when the Creeches filed bankruptcy, First
Security was not in a position to enforce the ipso facto clauses.
When the Creeches' bankruptcy was dismissed, the ipso facto clause
became enforceable and an event of default under the terms of the
1986 Loan Documents.
II.

THE CREECHES NON-PAYMENT DURING THE BANKRUPTCY CONSTITUTES
AN ACT OF DEFAULT UNDER THE 1986 LOAN DOCUMENTS.
In Lowry Federal Credit Union v. West, 882 F.2d 1543 (10th

Cir. 1989), a case cited by the Creeches in support of their
position, the court, in effect, approved the issue of whether or
not borrowers who had filed bankruptcy could be in default under
the "insecurity" clause of a loan agreement.

In that case, the

court determined that since the borrowers were current on all of
their payments, the creditor could not claim to be insecure simply
because the borrowers had filed bankruptcy.

The court said:

We are in accord with the district and
bankruptcy courts that the mere filing of
petition has not put Lowry [the creditor]
any more jeopardy than that which existed
to the filing of the petition. Lowry did
-4-

the
in
prior
not

introduce any evidence of actual prejudice but
merely relied upon speculative arguments over
dreadful possibilities that may result if the
debtors fail to exercise proper care of the
truck or ultimately fail to pay. While
evidence of actual prejudice might persuade us
to the contrary, we can see no harm resulting
to Lowry from the order of the bankruptcy court.
Id. at 1546 (emphasis added).
Unlike the borrowers in the Lowry case, the Creeches have not
remained current on their loan payments during the bankruptcy and
First Security has been forced to incur significant expense as a
result of the bankruptcy and subsequent State Court proceedings.
The Creeches also argue that the Bankruptcy Code "prevented"
them from making payments to First Security and cite 11 U.S.C.
§ 363 prohibiting the use of cash collateral during bankruptcy as
authority.

The Creeches admit in their brief that "[a]11 of the

Creeches' cash was generated from the sale of milk in which First
Security had a security interest."
Creech, p. 17, fn. 3.

Brief of Orville and Ruby

In short, the Creeches make the incredible

argument that they were prevented from making payments to First
Security during the bankruptcy because First Security held a
security interest in all of their cash collateral.
of that argument is obvious.

The circuity

Nothing in the Bankruptcy Code

prevented the Creeches from making payments to First Security
between November 28, 1986 when their bankruptcy was filed and
June 11, 1987 when their Plan of Reorganization was confirmed.

-5-

III.

FIRST SECURITY'S REQUEST THAT THE COURT REVIEW THE
ISSUE OF ATTORNEY'S FEES IS NOT PREMATURE.

The District Court's reservation of the issue of entitlement
to attorney's fees does not "cure" the sua sponte ruling of the
District Court declaring that perhaps the most important reason
for First Security's entitlement to attorney's fees simply did not
happen.
While the trial court purported to reserve the issue of
attorney's fees, it nevertheless effectively determined the
primary issues which are the foundation for First Security's
entitlement to attorney's fees.
IV.

UNDER 11 U.S.C. § 349, THE TRIAL COURT WAS OBLIGATED TO
RESTORE BOTH PARTIES TO THE STATUS QUO THAT EXISTED PRIOR
TO THE BANKRUPTCY.
Section 349 of the bankruptcy code discusses the effects of a

dismissal of a bankruptcy case.

The purpose of § 349 is to

restore all parties, as far as is practicable/ to the same
position they were in at the commencement of the case, and to
protect the rights of those who acted in reliance on the
bankruptcy case.

See In re Nash, 765 F.2d 1410, 1414 (9th Cir.

1985) and In re Newton, 64 B.R. 790, 793 (Bankr. C D . 111. 1986).
In its order, the trial court restored the Creeches to their
pre-bankruptcy position, declaring that First Security could not
use anything that occurred during the bankruptcy as an event of
default.

See Brief of Appellants, If 16.

However, the court

failed to provide the same relief for First Security.

During the

course of the bankruptcy First Security was forced to incur
-6-

significant attorney's fees in reliance upon the bankruptcy and in
an attempt to protect its property rights.

In order to restore

First Security to its pre-bankruptcy position, the court should
have awarded the amount of its costs and fees incurred during the
bankruptcy.
The Creeches argue that First Security's attorney's fees are
not compensable because they are not a "property right" that
existed prior to the bankruptcy.
Creech, p. 23.

See Brief of Orville and Ruby

That argument, however, misses the point.

If the

court insists on restoring the Creeches to their pre-bankruptcy
position, it must also do the same for First Security.

Anything

less than equal treatment for both parties would be inequitable.
For that reason, First Security is entitled to compensation for
the attorney's fees it was forced to incur during the Creeches'
bankruptcy proceedings.
V.

FIRST SECURITY IS ENTITLED TO A RULING FROM THIS COURT TO
DETERMINE WHETHER OR NOT THE CREECH CHILDREN ARE IN DEFAULT
UNDER THE 19 86 LOAN DOCUMENTS.
The Creech children are co-debtors on the 1986 Loan

Documents.

See Brief of Appellant, If 1.

The Creech children

argue that since First Security's motion before the trial court
did not claim that the Creech children were in default under the
1986 Loan Documents, that First Security is now prohibited from
raising that issue on appeal.
Creech, p. 4.

See Brief of Larry, Joann and Herb

This argument, however, overlooks the peculiar

procedural background of this issue.
-7-

First Security initially filed a motion before the trial court
seeking to enforce the terms of the Stipulation and Order agreed
upon with the Creeches in the bankruptcy.

See Brief of

Appellants, If 13. The Creech children were named as defendants in
that action.
At that time, the central issue before the court was whether
the bankruptcy Stipulation and Order or the original 1986 Loan
Documents controlled the relationship between the parties.

In

response, the trial court not only ruled that the 1986 Loan
Documents were controlling, but it also unexpectedly ruled that
the Creeches were not in default under the Loan Documents.

See

Brief of Appellants, 1f 16.
None of the parties had addressed the issue of default under
the 1986 Loan Documents.

Nevertheless, the trial court, on its

own initiative, ruled on that very issue.

The mere fact that

First Security did not formally "raise" the issue of the Creech
children's default under the Loan Documents is therefore
inconsequential.

Whether or not it was raised, the trial court

ruled on that issue, and First Security is entitled to ask this
court for a review of that ruling on appeal.
VI.

FIRST SECURITY IS NOT ESTOPPED FROM CLAIMING THAT THE
CREECH CHILDREN ARE IN DEFAULT UNDER THE 1986 LOAN
DOCUMENTS.
The Creech children argue that First Security is estopped from

claiming that the Creech children are in default under the 1986
Loan Documents because of First Security's negotiation of the
-8-

Stipulation and Order with the Creeches during the bankruptcy.
See Brief of Larry, Joann and Herb Creech, p. 5.

The Creech

children maintain that they relied on First Security's apparant
willingness to accept reduced payments according to the terms of
the Stipulation and Order, and that First Security is now estopped
from claiming a default based upon those reduced payments.

Id.

First Security acknowledges that the Creeches were entitled to
rely upon the terms of the Stipulation and Order in making reduced
payments to First Security.

Indeed, First Security does not claim

that the making of reduced payments was a default of the Loan
Documents.

However, the Creech children conveniently ignore the

fact that between the date of the bankruptcy and the date of the
Stipulation and Order, a period of approximately eight months,
neither the Creech parents nor the Creech children made any
payments to First Security.

See Brief of Appellants, If 3.

It is

this period of non-payment that constitutes a default under the
terms of the 1986 Loan Documents.

In addition, the Creeches have

now repudiated the Stipulation and Order, and the trial court
ruled that it was of no force and effect after the dismissal of
the bankruptcy.

For these reasons, First Security is not estopped

from claiming that the Creech children are in default under the
1986 Loan Documents.
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VII.

FIRST SECURITY'S STIPULATION AND ORDER WITH THE CREECHES
DOES NOT RELEASE THE CREECH CHILDREN FROM THEIR OBLIGATION
UNDER THE 1986 LOAN DOCUMENTS.
The Creech children argue that First Security's negotiation

and execution of the Stipulation and Order with the Creeches
during the bankruptcy releases them from all liability under the
1986 Loan Documents.
p. 5.

See Brief of Larry# Joann and Herb Creech,

This argument is flawed for two reasons.

First, although the Creech children were not formally named as
parties to the Stipulation and Order, they were aware of the
negotiations and they were present at the relevant hearings before
the bankruptcy court.

The Stipulation and Order was negotiated

with the full knowledge and consent of the Creech children.

In

addition, the terms of the Stipulation and Order were also
incorporated into the Creeches' plan of reorganization.
of Appellant, Iflf 7-8.

See Brief

Thus, when the plan of reorganization was

confirmed, the Creech children were bound by the terms of the
Stipulation and Order since it was incorporated into the confirmed
plan.
More importantly, however, the Creech children are not
released from their responsibilities under the 1986 Loan Documents
because the Stipulation and Order has been ruled to be
unenforceable.

In the context of the Creeches' bankruptcy, the

Stipulation and Order was an accord and satisfaction where First
Security agreed to renegotiate the terms of the Loan Documents.
Indeed, First Security argued that the trial court should enforce
-10-

the terms of the bankruptcy Stipulation and Order.
Appellant, If 13.

See Brief of

The Creeches, however, argued that the

Stipulation and Order negotiated in the context of the bankruptcy
was of no force or effect once the bankruptcy case had been
dismissed.

See id. at % 12.

The trial court ruled that the

bankruptcy Stipulation and Order was not enforceable outside of
bankruptcy.

See id. at M 16.

As a matter of law, if an accord

and satisfaction is determined to be invalid, the original
Documents between the parties remains valid and enforceable.

See

Golden Kev Realty, Inc. v. Mantas, 699 P.2d 730, 733 (Utah 1986)
and Restatement 2d of Contracts § 281 (1981).
Indeed the trial court, recognizing this principal, ruled that
since the bankruptcy Stipulation and Order was unenforceable, the
1986 Loan Documents remained in full force and effect.

That

portion of the trial court's ruling has not been appealed.

For

all of these reasons, the Creech children have not been released
from their obligation under the 1986 Loan Documents, and First
Security is entitled to maintain this action to enforce those
obligations.
CONCLUSION
The Creeches' filing of bankruptcy and their subsequent
non-payment during the bankruptcy constitute events of default
under the terms of the 1986 Loan Documents.

Upon the dismissal of

the Creeches1 bankruptcy case, First Security was entitled to
enforce its rights under the Loan Documents against all
-11-

defendants.
error.

The District Court's ruling to the contrary was in

The Distict Court also erred in denying First Security's

claim for reimbursement for attorney's fees incurred during the
bankruptcy.
First Security seeks a reversal of the decision of the
District Court respecting the effects of the bankruptcy of
defendants Orville and Ruby Creech and nonpayment by all
defendants of their obligations under the 1986 Loan Documents.
The case should be remanded to the District Court with
instructions to modify its Order Granting Defendants' Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment as follows:
1.

Ruling that defendants are in default under the 1986 Loan

Documents by reason of the bankruptcy and nonpayment of their
obligations under the terms of those documents during and after
the bankruptcy proceedings.
2.

Determining that/ as a result of said defaults, First

Security has incurred expenses, including attorneys' fees.
3.

Determining that First Security is entitled to recover

said expenses from defendants, including a reasonable attorneys'
fee in an amount to be determined by the District Court.
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